In Section 2 of the paper we gave a brief sketch of the Colombian context and some of the key pieces of evidence which undergird our approach. Here we present some additional case study evidence which supports our arguments and interpretations of the evidence.
we are able to access information on trial hearings and sentences (for open cases this information is confidential). Second, from secondary sources, mainly the press and NGO's investigating specific cases, we also have some information even for cases on which there is no definite sentence yet.
Our emphasis is on the role of incentives when explaining false positives, and in particular how these interacted with two main factors: first, a weak judicial system which made army members believe they could "get away" with the killings of civilians; second, the stronger incentives faced by colonels to commit false positives in search of promotion. We also discuss the incentive of the military to further erode the quality of judicial institutions, to facilitate committing these crimes. We further emphasize that the case study evidence is not consistent with false positives being simply the result of collateral damage, an unfortunate by-product of genuine combat activities.
A.3.1 The Role of Incentives
The case study evidence that we report in this section shows that the incentive package given to military personnel who excelled in the production of quantifiable counterinsurgency results included rewards, permits of absence or vacation time, honors and compliments from superiors, and promotions. In addition to the 'carrots', there were also sticks in the form of high pressure from superior officials to produce 'results' (in the form of killings) and penalties for soldiers who failed to do so. Crucially, the pressure was not merely to work hard in the fight against insurgents, but to deliver measurable results. Sticks thus operated with a similar logic as the carrots in our theoretical model: as high-powered incentives responding to alleged killed rebels. Indeed, several army officials who have been interviewed by the press after the scandal broke out have stated that the psychological torture of having to deliver operational results every day was unbearable. 43 One example of such pressure for results and punishment of failures can be seen in army official Edgar Iván Flórez Maestre's statement during his hearing before the General Prosecutor. According to Flórez, 14 th Brigade's commander Colonel Wilson Cedeño used to tell his troops: "Each company commander is responsible of one combat death per month, and the Second Section is responsible for three deaths per month. At this time war is measured with liters of blood. The commander that cannot show results in terms of deaths every month will face a sanction that will appear in his folder." Flórez also stated that colonel Juan Carlos Barrera Jurado, former commander of the 14 th Brigade, once told all battalion commanders under his orders that the battalions that did not have any killings in combat in the next 90 days would have their commanders fired for negligence and operational lack of capacity. According to Flórez, the pressure was so intense that soldiers would start counting the days that they had not faced combat. The excess pressure finally resulted in misbehavior. According to Flórez a fellow soldier once told him how frustrated he was that the only people that were getting permits of leave and honors were the ones that were producing killings, and so that he was planning a "job" for which he had already obtained a gun (to put on the victim's hands to make him appear as a combatant). 44 Major Juan Carlos Rodríguez Agudelo tells a similar story in an interview with newspaper El Tiempo. According to Rodríguez, while back in 1995 an honor medal was given for two combat kills, by 2004 the threshold had gone up to 10 kills. In staff operational meetings, commanders who had produced many killings were praised and those who could not show enough bodies were ridiculed by superiors. Rodríguez argues that wearing one of these honor medals had such high status within the army that the pursuit of glory pushed him to make mistakes and he ended up killing civilians. 45 Human Rights Watch (2015) presents a great deal of supportive evidence. For example, they cite retired Lieutenant Colonel Robinson González del Río as giving testimony that General Mario Montoya, the army's top commander between February 2006 and November 2008 "Pressured subordinate commanders to increase body counts, punishing them for failing to do so" (p. 4). Other testimony by army personnel suggested that Montoya "organized competitions between military units over the number of reported combat kills" (p. 27). González del Río told prosecutors that "you were evaluated based . . . on combat kills" (p. 27).
In addition to pressure and threats, 'positive' incentives played a major role. This is acknowledged by official Edgar Iván Flórez Maestre, in the same hearing mentioned above, when stating that one of the incentives offered to commanders of all battalions was vacation for the entire month of December for the platoon that could show the highest number of killings in a given year. In addition, the soldier that perpetrated the highest number of killings would be sent to Sinai, or a course out of the country. 46 In 2007, Sargent Alexander Rodríguez Sánchez reported to the authorities (the offices of the Attorney General and the General Prosecutor, and even the Army Command) that his unit, mobile Brigade 15, was engaging in unlawful assassinations of civilians in the department of Norte de Santander. Sargent Rodríguez reported that fellow soldiers that killed civilians and portrayed them as guerillas killed in combat were granted a five-day vacation period per casualty produced. His testimony accuses the unit commander, Colonel Santiago Herrera Fajardo, of having pressured battalion commanders to generate results. According to Rodríguez this was because the Army commander in chief, General Mario Montoya, was himself putting pressure on Herrera and other brigade commanders. 47 The accusation was investigated by a military committee headed by Montoya. The result was that Rodriguez was fired from the army while Colonel Herrera was promoted because of the operational results of his unit. 48 This is not the only testimony that relates commander in chief Montoya with putting pressure from above to unit commanders to produce results, in particular killings, as we noted above. In an interview with TV magazine Noticias RCN, Colonel Robinson González del Rio states that he once heard General Montoya saying "I want rivers of blood, I want results", and that he made famous a "top 10" ranking of units according to the results produced as measured by killings. 49 This is consistent with the concerns expressed by the US Embassy in Bogotá, in a cable filtered by Wikileaks, according to which General Montoya picked General Oscar Enrique González Peña as his successor as commander in chief of the military forces, praising him as "the best commander in the http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-11918454 (last accessed August 14, 2014).
46 Colombia is part of The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), an international peacekeeping force that operates in the Sinai peninsula overseeing the 1979 peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. 47 The lack of results of Brigade 15 that generated this pressure may have been a key factor triggering the Soacha killings. A witness in the Soacha case investigations, Sargent Muñoz, declared that after several reprimands from higher level officials, the brigade commander, Colonel Gabriel Rincón Amado agreed to "buy" civilians (from intermediaries who would recruit them for fake jobs) and present them as enemies killed in combat. This is how civilians Jhonnatan Orlando Soto (17) and Julio César Meza (24) disappeared from Soacha after accepting job offers from the recruiter. They were killed two days afterwards. The recruiters were payed 2.2 million pesos (just over US$ 1,000). After that, according to Sargent Muñoz, Colonel Rincón wanted to repeat the operation with more people ("Así se tejió la trampa de los falsos positivos", El Tiempo, May 24, 2009. Available at: http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/ MAM-3456789 (last accessed August 15, 2014)).
48 Sources: Beriain, David "A su muchacho lo matamos nosotros, señora" Agencia de Prensa Rural, May 24. Available at: http://prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?article1124 (last accessed August 14, 2014); and "Primer militar que denunció 'falsos positivos' en Norte de Santander está preso", El Tiempo, May 10, 2009. Available at:http:// www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-5177467 (last accessed August 14, 2014).
49 "General Montoya responde a denuncias del coronel Del Río", Semana.com, June 9, 2014. Available at: http://www .semana.com/nacion/articulo/general-montoya-responde-denuncias-del-coronel-del-rio/391036-3 (last accessed August 14, 2014).
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country" during his tenure in charge of the 4 th Brigade, because his unit reported the most killings of all: 857. 50 Finally, in the cited interview with El Tiempo, Major Juan Carlos Rodríguez Agudelo said that the instructions from above, all the way to General Montoya, first produced "bottles of blood" and that ended in "tanker trucks" of blood. Indeed, according to Major Rodríguez, soldiers that did not have any deaths in their history were "out of the system", and captures just did not count. 51 This suggests that while the cited formal documents emphasized both captures of insurgents and their death as acceptable outcomes, the informal incentives privileged killings over captures. In another telling example of his interview with El Tiempo, Major Rodríguez says that a common situation was one in which a soldier would call a superior to report, say, two killings and three captures, and the superior would reply by saying that he was now calling the local representative of the Attorney for him to remove all the five corpses, making clear that he expected the soldier to kill the three insurgents who had been captured.
Another incentive used to persuade army members to engage in this practice was the direct payment of rewards. Even if the Directive 29 and other of the cited documents do not mention military personnel as potential recipients of the money that the government had budgeted for intelligence rewards, army units designed mechanisms to allow for funds to be transferred to their soldiers if they were successful at producing results. According to Colonel Luis Fernando Borja, in addition to vacation and honors, soldiers could obtain cash. To this end, units would "create" fake informants that upon receiving the rewards would pass it to the command to distribute it discretionally among soldiers. Colonel Borja confessed he himself managed these funds in his unit. 52 Alfamir Castillo, mother of a false positive victim, Darvey Mosquera, told news web magazine La Silla Vacía that she had proof that each of the soldiers of Counter-guerilla battalion Mártires de Puerres, involved in the killing of her son and that of his friend, Alex Hernando Ramírez, received about 3 million pesos in addition to a one-month permit of absence. The two victims were portrayed as insurgents killed in combat. The Human Rights Watch report cites several other instances of this.
A.3.2 Oversight by Local Judicial Institutions
As noted in the text, the weakness of local judicial institutions in Colombia is well known. There is also evidence that the weakness of the judicial system facilitated these crimes. Several cases also reveal the resulting incentive, for army members, to further corrupt the judicial system in order to get away with the murder of civilians.
As a telling example, according to magazine Semana, Colonel Publio Hernán Mejía, former commander of "La Popa" battalion and now jailed for his links with paramilitaries and for committing extrajudicial executions of civilians, had little trouble in producing in false positives because the local representative of the Attorney General helped him with the setups necessary to 'legalize' 50 The Wikileak cable can be downloaded from: http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/11/08BOGOTA4028.html (last accessed August 14, 2014).
51 There are testimonies that involve the then Minister of Defense and current President, Juan Manuel Santos, in exerting pressure to commanders to produce results and threatening punishment to under-performers. However, in sharp contrast with the case of General Montoya, Santos does not appear to be asking for killings, just vaguely for 'results'. In his hearing before the Attorney General, Colonel Luis Fernando Borja Aristizabal, former commander of the Joint Task Force of Sucre, states that when Santos visited the area to preside over a Security Council, he addressed Borja and warned him that he needed to achieve measurable quantitative results, or else he would be fired. Borja, who confessed to having perpetrated 57 false positives and is now facing a 42-year sentence, told the attorney that he felt threatened ("El Coronel que confesó 57 falsos positivos", KienyKe, 30 August, 2011. Available at: http:// www.kienyke.com/historias/el-coronel-que-confeso-57-falsos-positivos/ (last accessed August 14, 2014)).
52 "Soy culpable", Semana, July 16, 2011. There is also indirect evidence of collaboration between local attorneys and the army when it comes to cases of false positives. According to the UN's Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in several instances of illegal executions of civilians, the local office of the attorney refrained from claiming the competence of removing the corpses and initiating a judicial investigation. In these circumstances, cases are referred to the military criminal justice system, largely accused of underplaying the importance of false positives. 56 Human Rights Watch document several cases where functionaries of the military judicial system helped cover up false positives even giving advice to soldiers as to how to make them look more 'realistic ' (pp. 77-81) .
As a consequence, the UN report conclusion that witnesses were not only afraid of the perpetrators, but also of the local attorneys and prosecutors, since they were believed to cooperate with the perpetrators. This was especially so in the most rural and remote areas. For instance, a human rights activist working in the Casanare region, told La Silla Vacía that it was the case that when people approached the authorities to report a disappearance of a family member, the next victims were themselves. Thus "a culture of silence was created". 57 As already mentioned, after the initial inspection and removal of the corpse by local attorneys, the investigations of alleged false positives are conducted by the judges who have jurisdiction in the area where the crime is perpetrated. However, this practice is sometimes detrimental for the success of investigations. Indeed, in cases in which the victim is abducted or disappears in one place but is executed in another, there is often a dispute of legal responsibility between the judges of the two jurisdictions. Because such disputes take long to resolve (up to a year in some cases), it is not uncommon that in the meantime parts of the evidence get lost and witnesses cannot be found or their memories have conveniently changed. This was frequently the case in the investigation of false positives. 58 This dual responsibility among judges of different jurisdictions also created incentives for the implicated parties to push for the investigations to end up in one place rather than the other. For instance the defense lawyers of the military members involved in the Soacha scandal formally asked for the cases to be transferred from the regular criminal system to the military criminal justice system. When the petition was denied, the attorneys requested for the cases to be transferred from 53 "De héroe a villano", Semana, January 27, 2007. Soacha, where the victims were recruited, to Norte de Santander, where the victims were killed. 59 This is quite a telling example, as the false positives in Soacha, which created the major media scandal around the phenomena, were perhaps particularly salient precisely because they occurred near the capital city of Bogotá, where state institutions including the judiciary are presumably stronger. Consistent with such situation, these victims were not actually executed near the recruitment cite as in most cases, but were taken far away before being killed.
Other evidence directly suggests that committing false positives likely led to a deterioration of institutional quality. Human Rights Watch (2015, p. 75) report a revealing transcript obtained by the newsmagazine Semana of a phone conversation in 2012 between the then-head of the army General Leonardo Barrero and Lieutenant Colonel González del Río who at the time was being investigated under arrest for his involvement in false positives. Barrero tells González del Río to "create a mafia" to discredit prosecutors. In order to perpetuate false positives there is also evidence that the army paid criminal organizations to find victims. We noted this in the Soacha case and González del Rio also testified that when he had commanded the Gaula Antioquia unit of the 4th Brigade General González Peña, commanded of the joint Caribbean Command, "suggested he work with organized crime groups to commit false positives" (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 68) . It is likely that things such as attacks on witnesses and threats also help to undermine local institutions (Human Rights Watch, 2015, p. 74) .
A.3.3 Promotion Incentives for Colonels
In our main theoretical and empirical analysis, we posited that the body count incentives that generated the surge in false positives after 2002 were stronger for colonels than for generals. Our empirical strategy builds on the idea that colonels leading brigades are, unlike generals, up for promotion. Therefore, high-powered incentives are more likely to have an effect on their behavior.
Recall for instance the example of Sargent Alexander Rodríguez, who testified to having witnessed the assassination of several civilians by his unit. However, after blaming the unit's colonel for orchestrating the killings, he had his testimony reviewed by a military board headed by General Mario Montoya. The outcome of the investigation was that Sargent Rodríguez was fired from the force, and the involved colonel was promoted. 60 In addition, Alfamir Castillo, mother of false positive victim Darvey Mosquera, told news web magazine La Silla Vacía that even if several soldiers were already serving jail time for the killing of her son, the officials that ordered the killing and organized for him to be portrayed as a guerilla were still free. The officials are Brigadier Generals Emiro José Barrios and Jorge Enrique Navarrete, both of whom were colonels at the time of the events. 61 "Entiendo a los soldados a pesar de que mataron a mi hijo. Cumplíanórdenes", LaSillaVacia.com, September 19, 2013. Available at: http://lasillavacia.com/historia/entiendo-los-soldados-pesar-de-que-mataron-mi-hijo -cumplian-ordenes-alfamir-castillo-45670 (last accessed September 20, 2014) .
62 This particular case is peculiar because it became known that the insurgent guerillas killed in combat were civilians because of two key witnesses. One was José Didier Marín, one of the three civilians targeted by the army, who happened to escape before they shot him. The other one was Ernesto Quintana, a soldier of the involved unit (Counter-guerilla Battalion Mártires de Puerres), who recognized his cousin was one of the victims when the perpetrators triumphantly showed the photo album of the alleged combat. When he asked his superiors why his civilian was cousin among the "insurgents" killed, they offered vacations and money for him to remain silent. When he left the battalion to take the promised vacation, he was warned that Major Linares had given orders to kill him. Both witnesses are now part of the government's witness protection program.
There are several accusations of colonels, acting as unit commanders, for orchestrating and perpetrating false positives. All of them share common features, for instance that colonels' main motive was to be promoted. For instance, according to magazine Semana, 27 soldiers, an entire platoon, were expelled from the army in 2008 for refusing to fire at two alleged guerilla members, but who were dressed as civilians and not engaging in combat. The platoon had seen two individuals in a guerilla camp site and, as one of them said, "it would have been easy to shoot and kill them, but they were unarmed and dressed as civilians". Moreover, they couldn't approach the camp for fear of land mines. When moving, however, the guerilla members in the area noticed the military presence and engaged in combat. The guerilla members escaped, but the soldiers captured one under-age female guerilla member and confiscated provisions and computers. Upon returning to their battalion with what they considered a positive outcome, the reaction of the platoon commander (a Lieutenant Colonel) is described by one of the soldiers as follows:
"When my colonel came in he started insulting us and scolding us and told us that we were good for nothing, that we did not understand that the live guerilla insurgent was useless for him, and that what mattered were killings because he was going to be promoted to colonel and he was "measured" that way. He told us he was going to have us all expelled." 63
A.3.4 The Issue of Collateral Damage
It is important to note that the case study literature also decisively suggests that false positives cannot be interpreted as simple collateral damage which occurs as an unfortunate by product of taking the fight to the guerillas. This is because the evidence is overwhelming that this was a planned criminal operation by the army. Human Rights Watch interviews with military officers confirmed that units had "systems in place for committing false positives" (p. 6) and officers would "meet with their battalion commander on a weekly basis to plan false positives" (p. 6) moreover "the crimes required significant organizing, planning, and logistical coordination by military officers and soldiers" (p. 25).
Evidence against the collateral damage hypothesis also comes from the copious judicial and media evidence. Human Rights Watch (p. 25) quotes a 2012 report from the International Criminal Court that sums up a large body of this evidence by saying that false positives "were directed against particular categories of civilians, who resided in remote areas and were considered to belong to a marginalized sector of the population". Human Rights Watch goes on to note that victims "included farmers, children, unemployed people, homeless people, people . . . dependent on drugs, people with mental disabilities, community leaders, people with criminal records, petty criminals. Demobilized guerillas and paramilitaries, and in some rare cases, supposed guerilla collaborators or guerillas who had been detained or surrendered" (p. 25). Thus committing false positives was a purposeful activity which was not a natural side effect of engaging in actual combat with guerillas. This feature also suggests that it probably substituted for such actual combat and what we have termed true positives.
A.4 Theoretical Results for the Perfect Substitutes and Perfect Complements Cases
First consider the perfect complements case, where 63 "La historia inédita de los falsos positivos", Semana, July 6, 2013. Available at: http://www.semana.com/nacion/ articulo/la-historia-inedita-falsos-positivos/349851-3 (last accessed September 20, 2014).
Then, after setting
to minimize costs and substituting in the objective function, we obtain the following optimal efforts:
Proposition A.1. (False positives with perfect technological complements) Suppose that false and true positives are perfect technological complements, with
Then, a marginal increase in incentives s:
1. Increases true and false positives.
2. Leads to a larger increase in true and false positives where reported output is a more important part of compensation (higher π).
3. Leads to a larger increase in true and false positives where misrepresentation of false positives is more likely (higher α)
Proof. All results follow directly from expressions (A.1) and (A.2) together with expressions (6) and (7) in the main text for
Now consider the perfect substitutes case, where δ = √ c T c F . Then, we can write the first order conditions for maximization of the agent's payoff in complementary slackness form as follows:
Therefore, we cannot have both a F > 0 and a T > 0 except in a borderline case. More specifically:
This is enough to establish our main results. Then, agents specialize in one kind of effort (a * T > 0 and a * F = 0 or a * T = 0 and a * F > 0) except if
A marginal increase in incentives s:
1. (Weakly) increases observed false and true positives,
= 0 ⇔ a * T = 0 (the agent specializes in bad effort), and
(the agent specializes in good effort and false positives are purely intentional).
2. Leads to a (weakly) larger increase in false and true positives where reported output is a more important part of compensation (higher π),
3. Leads to a (weakly) larger increase in false and true positives where misrepresentation of false positives is more likely (higher α),
Proof. All implications follow directly from (A.4) combined with expressions (6) and (7) in the main
Contrasting Proposition A.2 with Proposition 1 in the main text, the only difference is in prediction 3. In particular, we no longer obtain the result emphasized throughout the discussion that true positives may respond less in areas where α is larger so long as false positives are largely intentional (small χ). However, this contrast emerges not from a deep fundamental difference in the predictions, but from the fact that the propositions have been established for marginal changes in incentives and surrounding conditions. But in the perfect substitutes case, agents select a corner solution except in a borderline case. Thus, it is more important to focus on the implications that the changes in underlying parameters have on the agent's choice about which effort to choose, good or bad.
The next corollary establishes a result with implications along the lines of prediction 4 in Proposition 1 in the main text. In particular, it shows that, as long as false positives are largely intentional, it is more likely that the agent specializes in bad effort in places with weak institutions. This implies that, when comparing places with stronger and weaker institutions, the impact of incentives on true positives is smaller in places with weaker institutions (namely, no impact) than in those with stronger institutions (where there should be an increase). Then, weaker institutions are more likely to lead to specialization in bad effort (a * T = 0 and a * F > 0) if and only if:
Proof. The result follows directly from inspecting the effect of an increase in α in either term of the inequality
the key condition in (A.4).
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A.5 Implications for E(q)
Consider focusing on:
To see that comparative statics are identical as when focusing on E[exp(q * J )] it suffices to notice that for J ∈ {F, P } ∂a
Therefore, after deriving, substituting these properties and rearranging, the following equivalences hold for true positives:
Similarly, for false positives:
Since E[exp(q * J )], 1 + a * T , and 1 + χa * T + a * F are strictly positive, this establishes that the sign of the partials and cross partials for E[exp(q * J )] is determined by the sign of the partials and cross partials for E[q * J ] -since in each case, the partials and cross partial of E[q * J ] are given by the terms in parentheses, which give the responses of a * T and χa * T + a * F to the parameter changes.
A.6 Ratio of Outputs and Bad Effort
As noted in the text, examining the response of the ratio of true to false positives to incentives does not help determine the role of bad relative to good effort. To see this, define this ratio as
Taking the derivative with respect to incentives s and using ∂a * T (s)/∂s = a * T (s)/s, we find
Thus, even with agents exerting bad effort, the ratio of false to true positives may increase or decrease depending on the (unknown) relative magnitudes of good effort, bad effort, and the fraction of collateral damage (which moreover has been assumed constant for tractability, but could vary with the degree of effort further complicating the relationship between the importance of both types of effort and the ratio of observed false to true positives).
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A.7 Additional Tables and Figures

Judicial Institutions
Judicial Inefficiency Index Ratio of complaints against functionaries in the judicial branch to total complaints. Measured from 2000 to 2010.
Inspector General (Procuraduría).
Security
Guerilla, government, or paramilitary attacks Dummy variable that equals 1 if the corresponding group perpetrated any attack on a given municipality and year, from 2000 to 2010.
CERAC-Universidad del Rosario with information from CINEP.
Explanatory variables
Initial Judicial Inefficiency Ratio of complaints against functionaries in the judicial branch to total complaints, from 1995 to 1999 (before the main sample period)
Colonels
We use three measures at the year and municipality level: a dummy, unweighted share, and weighted share. The dummy is simply an indicator variable that equals one if any of the brigades operating in a given municipality are led by colonels. The unweigthed share computes the share of brigades with influence in the municipality that are led by colonels. The weighted share computes the share weighting by brigade population, defined as the total population in municipalities under each brigade's jurisdiction. We also distinguish between the mobile brigade share and regular colonel-led brigade share in additional Appendix exercises. The mobile brigade share is the ratio of mobile to total brigades in the municipality (with mobile brigades always led by colonels), and te regular colonel share is the ratio of colonel-led regular brigades to total brigades. (1999, 2008) . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level. , average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, 1999 coca cultivated area per 100 hectares and 1995-1999 average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. (1999, 2008) . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
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A-17 , average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, fraction of coca cultivated area, and average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor. of time invariant predetermined municipal controls: quartic polynomial for logarithm of the population in 2000, average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, fraction of coca cultivated area, and average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor. (1999, 2008) . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
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A-20 of time invariant predetermined municipal controls: quartic polynomial for logarithm of the population in 2000, average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, fraction of coca cultivated area, and average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
A-21 
(8) index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerrilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, 1999 coca cultivated area per 100 hectares and 1995-1999 average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
A-22 of time invariant predetermined municipal controls: logarithm of the population in 2000, average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, fraction of coca cultivated area, and average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
A-23 , average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, fraction of coca cultivated area, and average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor. test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, fraction of coca cultivated area, and average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
A-25 level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerrilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, 1999 coca cultivated area per 100 hectares and 1995-1999 average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor. Table A- 
Dependent variable is judicial inefficiency of the population in 2000, average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, 1999 coca cultivated area per 100 hectares and 1995-1999 average protests per capita. Outliers in columns 5 to 8 are defined as those observations below the 2.5th and above the 97.5th percentile in the distribution of estimation residuals from the corresponding baseline regression. Errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. * is significant at the 10% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, *** is significant at the 1% level. , average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, 1999 coca cultivated area per 100 hectares and 1995-1999 average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level.
A-28 Table A- , average rainfall level, distance to the closest major city, quality of soil index, erosion index, water availability index, average elevation, municipality area, students' test results in math, science and language, poverty index, log of tax income per capita, presence of navy, paramilitary and guerrilla attacks, unemployment rate, catholic churches per capita, 1999 coca cultivated area per 100 hectares and 1995-1999 average protests per capita. Errors in parentheses control for spatial and first-order time correlation following Conley (1999 Conley ( , 2008 . We allow spatial correlation to extend to up to 279 km from each municipality's centroid to ensure that each municipality has at least one neighbor.
